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Abstract
We consider two-player games of perfect information of length some car-
dinal κ. It is well-known that for κ ≥ ω1 the full axiom of determinacy for
these games fails, thus we investigate three weaker forms of it. We obtain
the measurability of κ+ under DCκ-the axiom of dependent choices general-
ized to κ. We generalize the notions of perfect and meager sets and provide
characterizations with some special kinds of games. We show that under an
additional assumption one of our three axioms follows from the other two.
Zusammenfassung
Wir betrachten unendliche Spiele der La¨nge κ, wobei κ eine Kardinalzahl
ist. Es ist bekannt, dass im Fall κ ≥ ω1 fu¨r solche Spiele das u¨bliche De-
terminierheitsaxiom inkonsistent ist. Aus diesem Grund betrachten wir drei
schwa¨chere Versionen hiervon. Mit hilfe von DCκ zeigen wir die Messbarkeit
von κ+. Wir verallgemeinern die bekannten Begriffe der perfekten und
mageren Mengen und geben Charakterisierungen durch spezielle Spielvari-
anten. Unter einer zusa¨tzlichen Voraussetzung zeigen wir, dass eins unserer
drei Axiomen aus den anderen beiden folgt.
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1 Introduction
The Axiom of Determinacy is the following statement:
(AD) Every two-person game of length ω where the players play ordinals
smaller than ω is determined.
A natural question to ask is whether the restriction on the length could be
relaxed, i.e. whether an axiom of the following (stronger) kind is worth
considering:
(ADκ) Every two-person game of length κ where the players play ordinals
smaller than κ is determined.
It turns out that, for κ ≥ ω1, ADκ is inconsistent with the axioms of ZF. The
topic of this dissertation are three ways of weakening ADκ which might be
consistent with ZF, DCκ and κ = 2
<κ. These three axioms are well-known
and studied in the case κ = ω under the names Turing Determinacy (TD),
∗-Determinacy and ∗∗-Determinacy.
Informally our generalizations will be as follows. The axiom TDκ says
roughly that if we define Turing degrees on κ-sequences in a natural way,
then the union of every set of Turing degrees is determined as a subset of the
set of all κ-sequences. The axiom of ∗-Determinacy just states that if player
I is allowed to play bounded subsets of κ, then the game is determined and
∗∗-determinacy states the same under the condition that both players are
allowed to play non-empty bounded subsets.
We will study some consequences of these axioms in the presence of the
axiom DCκ which is a generalization of the usual axiom of dependent choices.
With the help of Turing determinacy we present a generalization of the result
of Martin that every set of Turing degrees contains a cone or is disjoint from
a cone and thus show the measurability of the ”next cardinal”, while with the
help of ∗ determinacy we provide a generalization of the perfect set property
for the reals, whose role is played by κ-sequences in our context.
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We will also generalize one result of the κ = ω case which gives a relation
between the three axioms, namely that ∗-Determinacy follows from the other
two. For this generalization however, we are going to need a stronger addi-
tional assumption. κ will always be a regular cardinal satisfying κ = <κκ.
We will consider both the spaces of sequences of members of {0, 1} of length
κ and of sequences of ordinals smaller than κ of length κ. We will call the
former space Cκ and the latter Bκ when they are endowed with the natural
topology generalizing the usual topology of the Baire space.
It would also probably be meaningful to mention here some negative
results which may lead one to suspect that a reasonable principle implying
all these three axioms (other than their conjunction) may not exist. In the
case κ = ω this role is played by AD itself as is well-known. Now since
for κ ≥ ω1 we cannot use ADκ it seems natural to consider some of its
weakenings.
One possibility is the following axiom which we now provisionally call
AWDκ. Consider the following situation. One of the players - X can con-
sistently prevent the other - Y from reaching a winning position. Now for
a game of length ω this is equivalent to Y having no winning strategy. So
if we postulate that in such cases X has a winning strategy this would be
equivalent to AD. With longer games however there is one big difference
and that is the fact that the ”partial games” are not necessarily determined.
Here for a game of length κ a partial game is a game of length some ordinal
γ < κ where one of the players tries to reach a winning position and the other
tries to prevent this from happening. Now if κ = ω the partial games are
all finite and thus determined, but when κ > ω one cannot expect to have
this property. Therefore the condition, that if one of the players prevents the
other one from winning, then the first one wins, is strictly weaker than full
determinacy and is thus not outright inconsistent.
One thing that could intuitively speak in favor of AWDκ is the fact, that
as we are going to show, under the additional requirement that κ is weakly
compact, weak determinacy does hold for open sets, much like in the case of
κ = ω.
However it is not hard to see that AWDκ contradicts AD. Let now B
be an arbitrary subset of the Baire space. Consider the following game of
length κ. The first move of I is ignored. Let δ be the first move of II. Then
next δ moves of both players are also ignored. Then from δ onwards in the
next ω moves the players’ moves are interpreted as an ω-long game for B
and whoever wins this game wins the original game of length κ. It is obvious
4
that the game just described satisfies the assumptions for the application
of AWDκ, and so it is determined, but this means that B is determined as
well. As a result we obtain that AWDκ is inconsistent. A similar argument
disproves the variant of AWDκ where the game is played only with members
of {0, 1}. If one tries to generalize determinacy via continuous maps as in
[7], one gets an axiom equivalent to AWDκ, which is then also inconsistent.
Another attempt may be to generalize a particularly useful property
which follows from AD - the so-called ”final segment determinacy”. This
is a full determinacy condition on a class of games which play an important
role in some of the consequences of AD. A game depending on a final seg-
ment is a game where the beginning doesn’t affect the outcome, or, in other
words, a game depends on a final segment if either one of the players has a
winning strategy from the start, or neither player can reach a winning posi-
tion in a finite number of moves. Final segment determinacy in turn implies
Turing determinacy and ∗- and ∗∗-Determinacy, but an argument similar to
the one above shows that it cannot be generalized (at least directly) to games
of length κ > ω, if we want to have DCκ, which is a too big constraint.
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2 The spaces κκ and κ2
We introduce the notion of a κ-topology as a generalization of the usual
notion of topology.
Definition 2.0.1 Let κ be a cardinal, X be a set and O ⊆ P(X). O is a
κ-topology on X if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) ∅, X ∈ O.
2) If F ⊆ O, then ⋃F ∈ O.
3) If F ⊆ O and | F |< κ, then ⋂F ∈ O.
A base for the κ-topology O is a family B ⊆ O such that any set in O can be
written as a union of elements of B. An open (or a κ-open) set is a member
of O, a closed (or a κ-closed) set is a member of {F | X − F ∈ O}.
So O is a topology on X when O is an ω-topology on X.
In a similar fashion we can generalize topological notions to their corre-
sponding ”κ-notions”. The intuition is that we just modify the respective
definition by substituting according to following ”dictionary”:
”usual” notion ”κ-notion”
finite having cardinality smaller than κ
countable having cardinality smaller than or equal to κ
uncountable having cardinality greater than κ
ω κ
ω1 κ
+
etc.
So for example a κ-meager set is a union of at most κ many nowhere dense
sets.
We now endow κκ = {f | f : κ → κ} and κ2 = {f | f : κ → 2} with κ-
topologies by generalizing the topologies of the Baire and the Cantor spaces
in the obvious way.
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Definition 2.0.2 Let s ∈ <κκ, t ∈ <κ2. Set Ns := {f ∈ κκ | s ⊂ f} and
Ot := {f ∈ κ2 | s ⊂ f}. Denote by Bκ the κ-topology on κκ, generated by the
base ⋃
s∈<κκ
{Ns}.
Denote by Cκ the κ-topology on κ2, generated by the base⋃
t∈<κ2
{Ot}.
By the observation that for every s ∈ <κκ,
κκ−Ns =
⋃
r 6⊂s∧s6⊂r
Nr,
we get that Bκ is zero-dimensional, and in the same way we can show this
for Cκ. As a further illustration of the terminology we observe that in case
κ = κ<κ, then Bκ is κ-separable and κ-second countable, and so is Cκ when
κ = 2<κ.
We give a characterization of κ-closed sets, which corresponds to the
completeness property of the usual metric of the Baire space - a set is closed
iff it contains all its limit points.
Proposition 2.0.3 If a set A ⊆ κκ is κ-closed, then for every sequence
{fα}α<κ of members of A, such that for each α < κ there is a γ < κ, so that
for all ξ, η > γ, fξ  α = fη  α, the ’limit’ of the sequence is in A, in other
words there exists an f ∈ A, such that for every α < κ there is a γ < κ, such
that fγ  α = f  α.
Proof. Suppose A is κ-closed and let {fα}α<κ be as required. That the
’limit’ exists is obvious, just set for each γ,
f(γ) = ” that δ, which is the value at γ for cofinally many fα’s.”
Assume now f ∈ κκ−A, then as κκ−A is κ-open, there is a basic open
neighbourhood of f , contained in it. Contradiction.

We leave the generalization of the perfect set notion for the next section,
as the situation there is a bit trickier.
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We will assume that we have a coding of ordinals below κ+ by subsets of
κ, or which is equivalent by members of Cκ or Bκ for every cardinal κ. This
can be done uniformly in many ways of course and it doesn’t matter which
one we chose, so we will just assume that we are given a reasonable one.
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3 Trees and perfect sets
The notion of a tree is standard in set theory. We fix now the notation for
the most general case.
Definition 3.0.4 A tree is an ordered pair T = (T,<), where T is a set,
<⊆ T × T , < is a partial order on T and for each x ∈ T the set
x< = {y ∈ T | y < x}
of the < predecessors of x is well-ordered by <.
If T = (T,<) is a tree and x ∈ T , denote by
ht(x,T) = otp(x<)
the height of x in T, where otp denotes order type for well-ordered sets.
Define the height of T as
ht(T) = sup{ht(x,T) + 1 | x ∈ T},
for α < ht(T), define the α-th level and the α-subtree of T,
Tα = {x ∈ T | ht(x,T) = α}, T<α = {x ∈ T | ht(x,T) < α}.
Definition 3.0.5 For a tree T = (T,<T ) a branch B of T is a maximal
chain of <T , i.e. a maximal linearly ordered (by <T ) subset of T . A branch
B is cofinal if for every α < ht(T) there is an x ∈ Tα ∩B.
We state now several weak versions of the axiom of choice, the strongest of
which we are going to assume for practical purposes, e.g. in order for our
trees to behave as expected. The axiom of dependent κ-choices DCκ was
first introduced in [1].
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(DCκ) For every set X 6= ∅ and every relation R ⊆ X2, such that for all
α < κ and every sequence s = 〈xδ | δ < α〉 of elements of X there exists a
y ∈ X with sRy (i.e. for every δ < α xδRy) there exists a function
f : κ→ X such that
∀α < κ∀δ < αf(δ)Rf(α).
(ACκ) Every set X with |X | ≤ κ has a choice function.
(Wκ) For every set X either |X| ≤ κ or κ ≤ X.
The axiom Wκ is to be read as ”if there is no injection from X into κ,
then there is an injection from κ into X”.
Lemma 3.0.6 (DCκ)
a) ACκ,
b) Wκ,
c) If |X | ≤ κ and for every X ∈ X X ≤ κ, then |⋃X| ≤ κ,
d) κ+ is regular.
Proof. Standard.

The notion of a weakly compact cardinal has many equivalent definitions.
We give here the relevant one after introducing some terminology.
Definition 3.0.7 For κ a cardinal and T a tree, we say that T is a κ-tree
if ht(T) = κ and for each α < κ, |Tα| < κ. A κ-tree is κ-Aronszajn if it has
no cofinal branch.
Definition 3.0.8 A cardinal κ has the tree property if there are no κ-Aronszajn
trees.
Definition 3.0.9 A cardinal κ is weakly compact if κ has the tree property
and κ is inaccessible, i.e. ∀α < κ(2α < κ).
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Note that the last definition is mostly interesting in the presence of at least
as much choice as DCκ provides, since otherwise the powerset of an ordinal
smaller than κ may fail to be well-orderable.
We begin now the considerations leading to the generalization of the
perfect set notion. First let us do a quick summary of some basic definitions
and facts.
Definition 3.0.10 Let 〈X,O〉 be an ω-topological space. A subset A of X is
called perfect if it is closed and consists exclusively of limit points (i.e. for
every point x in A and every open set B with x ∈ B there is a point y 6= x
with y ∈ B).
Proposition 3.0.11 (Cantor) For every perfect A ⊆ Cω |A| = 2ω.

It is at this point that the generalization from ω-topologies to κ-topologies
becomes a bit more subtle.
Let us start by directly generalizing the perfect set definition.
Definition 3.0.12 Let 〈X,O〉 be a κ-topological space. Call a subset A of
X perfect (or κ-perfect) if it is closed and has no isolated points.
Definition 3.0.13 A tree T = 〈T, <〉 of height κ is perfect if for every
x ∈ T there are y, z ∈ T with
a) x < y and x < z,
b) z  y and y  z.
Notation 3.0.14 For a tree T = 〈T,<〉 of height κ let [T ] be the set of all
cofinal branches of T .
Proposition 3.0.15 A subset A of Cκ is perfect iff A = [T ], where T =
〈T,<〉 is a perfect tree of height κ, such that for every x ∈ T x ∈ <κ2 and
x < y ⇐⇒ x ⊆ y.
Proof. Standard.

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With the help of 3.0.15 we can easily construct a counterexample to the
straight-forward generalization of the property 3.0.11, which might look ap-
pealing on a first glance. To this end consider some cardinals λ < κ and the
tree
T = 〈{x ∈ <κ2 | |{α | x(α) = 1}| < λ},⊆〉.
To see that T is perfect is trivial and it is easy to see that |[T ]| = κλ which
is usually less than 2κ.
With the above in mind let us mention that there are at least two pos-
sible ways of generalizing the perfect sets, the most straight-forward being
to just require that the size of such sets is big enough, i.e. 2κ. While this
generalization is sufficient for lifting some properties from ω to κ it will not
be enough e.g. for the usual characterisation via ∗-games, so we take the
other, more refined possibility.
Definition 3.0.16 For A a subset of Cκ or Bκ call A strongly perfect iff A
is closed and there is a homeomorphism
h : Cκ → 〈A,OA〉,
where OA is the topology on A induced by the topology on Cκ.
Remark 3.0.17 The above definition should formally require a κ-homeomorphism.
The collection of sets with the perfect set property is as we have seen not
so interesting in this case, so we modify the definition accordingly to get a
meaningful generalization. Again we mention that this could have been done
in other ways as well.
Definition 3.0.18 A subset P of Cκ or Bκ is strongly psp if one of the
following is satisfied.
a) |P | ≤ κ.
b) There is a subset B of P , such that B is strongly perfect.
We see now, that our generalization of perfect is stronger than the direct
one.
Lemma 3.0.19 If P ⊆ Bκ is strongly perfect, then P contains no isolated
points and |P | = 2κ.
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Proof. If f is an isolated point of P , then {f} is an open set in 〈X,OX〉
contradicting the existence of a homeomorphism between X and Cκ. For
the second assertion let T be the tree on κ<κ with P = [T ] (=the set of
infinite branches of T ). We claim that T is < κ-closed. To see this assume
the opposite and let t0 < · · · < tα < · · · , α < δ for some δ < κ be a
counterexample. Then Nt0  X ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ntα  X ⊃ · · · , α < δ is a nested
sequence of < κ basic open sets with empty intersection again violating the
homeomorphism requirement. Now T is a prefect < κ-closed tree, so it is
easy to see that |P | = |[T ]| = 2κ.

We will give another characterisation of strongly perfect sets after we
introduce the ∗-games for κ-sequences.
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4 Turing reducibility for Cκ and Bκ
In the case κ = ω the study of Turing reducibility and Turing degrees is one
of the central subjects of recursion theory. The most common definition goes
as follows.
Definition 4.0.20 For f, g ∈ ωω, f ≤T g if there is an index e of an oracle
Turing machine, so that for every x ∈ ω, f(x) = y iff {e}g = y.
In the context of our longer sequences however, if we want to generalize
this definition directly, we would run into considerable technical difficulties,
the most significant of which is having to deal with infinite computations.
Instead of doing this, we consider a characterization of Turing reducibility,
whose generalization turns out to be easier.
We state first the well known definition of the sets hereditarily of size less
than a given cardinal.
Definition 4.0.21 For λ a cardinal let
Hλ = {x | |TC(x)| < λ},
the set of all sets of hereditary cardinality smaller than λ, where TC(x) is
the smallest transitive set, containing x as an element.
A nice feature of Hλ is that it is usually not too big.
Proposition 4.0.22 (DCκ) If κ = 2
<κ,
|Hκ| = κ.
Proof. ”≥”: Every ordinal smaller than κ is in |Hκ|, so we just take the
identity here.
”≤”: Define the function F : ON → V by transitive recursion as follows:
F (0) = ∅,
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F (α + 1) = {x ⊆ F (α) | |x| < κ},
F (λ) =
⋃
α<λ
F (α) , for limit λ.
We now have:
(1)
⋃
α∈On F (α) =
⋃
α<κ F (α),
Proof. We first use the regularity of κ to show that F (κ + 1) = F (κ).
Indeed if x ∈ F (κ + 1), then by definition x ⊆ ⋃α<κ Fα. Now since
|x| < κ and κ is regular there is a β < κ with x ∈ F (β), hence x ∈ F (κ)
and the equality follows.
Now immediately F (θ) = F (κ) for every θ > κ.
(2) Hκ =
⋃
α<κ F (α),
Proof.
”⊇” by induction F (α) ⊆ Hκ for every α,
”⊆” by rank induction x ∈ Hκ → x ∈
⋃
α<κ F (α)
(3) |⋃F (α)| ≤ κ.
Proof. By κ = <κ2 it follows by induction that for every α |F (α)| ≤ κ.
Now we use 3.0.6.

The characterization of Turing reducibility is now the following.
Proposition 4.0.23 For f , g ∈ ωω
f ≤T g iff f is ∆1 definable with parameters in 〈Hω,∈, g〉.
Proof. Standard.

Our generalization now can be done by substituting κ for ω, just as our
’dictionary’ above prescribes.
Definition 4.0.24 If f , g ∈ κκ (or f , g ∈ κ2), say that f ≤T g iff
f is ∆1 definable with parameters in 〈Hκ,∈, g〉.
f ≡T g iff f ≤T g&g ≤T f.
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We first check that the definition is correct.
Proposition 4.0.25 The relation ≡T is an equivalence relation.
Proof.
i) To see that f ≡T f , note that f is definable in 〈Hκ,∈, f〉 (even without
parameters) via the Σ0 formula
ϕ(〈x, y〉) = 〈x, y〉 ∈ f.
ii) To see the transitivity of ≤T suppose that f ≤T g via the ∆1 formula
ϕ with parameters p1, · · · , pn and g ≤T h via the ∆1 formula ψ with
parameters q1, · · · , qk. Consider the following formula:
χ(〈x, y〉) = ”the formula ϕ, where each instance of the predicate
g is substituted by the formula ψ .”
It is not hard to see that χ is a ∆1 formula with parameters p1, · · · , pn,
q1, · · · qk, and so f is definable in 〈Hκ,∈, h〉 via χ.

Remark 4.0.26 In the proof of the last proposition we have tacitly used the
convention that a formula which is true only on pairs is written with an
explicit pair as a formal parameter, e.g. ϕ(〈x, y〉) = 〈x, y〉 ∈ f. Formally
such a formula is to be understood as a formula with an arbitrary parameter
which has in its definition an additional check that the argument is actually
a pair. Thus the example formula just given is to be read as
ϕ(z) = (z = 〈x, y〉) ∧ (〈x, y〉 ∈ f).
Note that there is no danger in confusing the complexity in this way, since
the formula ”z = 〈x, y〉” has a Σ0 definition (∃a ∈ z∃b ∈ z(a = {x} ∧ b =
{x, y} ∧ ∀t ∈ z(t = a ∨ t = b))). We will keep using this convention.
Definition 4.0.27 For a ⊆ Bκ, a is a Turing degree in Bκ iff for each
f, g ∈ a, f ≡T g and for every f ∈ a and h ∈ Bκ − a it is not true that
f ≡T h. For f ∈ Bκ we write [f ]κ for the unique Turing degree in Bκ to
which f belongs.
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Definition 4.0.28 For a ⊆ Cκ, a is a Turing degree in Cκ iff for each f, g ∈
a, f ≡T g and for every f ∈ a and h ∈ Cκ−a it is not true that f ≡T h. For
f ∈ Cκ we write [f ]2 for the unique Turing degree in Bκ to which f belongs.
The correctness of these definitions follows, of course, by the fact that
≡T is an equivalence relation, and so the ordering of members of Bκ and Cκ
with respect to Turing reducibility lifts directly to orderings of the Turing
degrees.
Definition 4.0.29 For Turing degrees (in Cκ or Bκ) a and b we say that
a ≤ b if for some (all) f ∈ a and for some (all) g ∈ b we have f ≤T g.
We are not going to investigate the structure of these Turing degrees in
too much detail here. Nevertheless we give some definitions and properties
which will be relevant to us later.
First comes the observation that there is a one to one correspondence
between the members of Bκ and Cκ. This will help us later, when we are
proving properties about the structure of one of these sets, to get the same
properties for the other.
Lemma 4.0.30 For every degree a in Bκ there is an h ∈ Cκ, such that h ∈ a.
Proof. Pick a representative f ∈ a and consider g ∈ Cκ, such that
g(〈α, β〉) = 0 ⇐⇒ f(α) = β.
It is not hard to see that f ≡T g.

Lemma 4.0.31 For every f ∈ Cκ,
[f ]2 = Cκ ∩ [f ]κ.
Proof. By transitivity of ≡T .

Lemma 4.0.32 There is a one to one correspondence between the degrees
in Cκ and Bκ that preserves the relation ≤T .
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Proof. By the previous two lemmas.

Next we turn to the generalization of the Turing jump operation known
from the study of the usual Turing degrees. This will be our only way to
obtain a Turing degree strictly higher than a given degree.
Lemma 4.0.33 (DCκ), (κ =
<κ2)
For every degree a ∈ Bκ there is a degree b ∈ Bκ, such that a < b.
Proof. Suppose a = [f ]κ for some f ∈ Bκ. Consider now the set
A = {〈i, α, p〉 | 〈Hκ,∈, f〉 |= ϕi(α) with parameter p},
where 〈ϕi | i ∈ ω〉 is some enumeration of all Σ1 formulas. By lemma 4.0.22
|A| ≤ κ and so with some kind of appropriate coding we can regard A as
a subset of κ. We now apply a standard diagonalization procedure to show
that κ − A is not Σ1 definable in 〈Hκ,∈, f〉 with parameters. To this end
assume κ − A is definable, say via the formula ϕj with parameter q. Then
for an arbitrary ordinal β < κ we have
〈j, β, q〉 ∈ A ⇐⇒ 〈Hκ,∈, f〉 |= ϕj(β) with parameter q
⇐⇒ 〈j, β, q〉 ∈ κ− A.
As a corollary we have that A is not Π1 definable in 〈Hκ,∈, f〉 with param-
eters, and hence not ∆1 definable.
That f is ∆1 definable in 〈Hκ,∈, A〉 is trivial, so we take b = [g]κ, where
g = {〈α, 0〉 | α ∈ A} ∪ {〈α, 1〉 | α ∈ κ− A}.

Lemma 4.0.34 (DCκ), (κ =
<κ2)
For every degree a ∈ Bκ |a| ≤ κ.
Proof. Let a = [f ]κ. Put
B = {g ∈ Bκ | g is definable with parameters in 〈Hκ,∈, f〉}.
Since the set of formulas is countable and by 4.0.22 |Hκ| ≤ κ we get |B| ≤ κ.
Now since obviously [f ]κ ⊆ B the result follows.

Now we generalize the join operation from ordinary recursion theory.
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Lemma 4.0.35 For every sequence of Turing degrees a1, a2, · · · , aα, · · · with
α < κ in Bκ, there exists a Turing degree a in Bκ, such that
∀α < κ(aα ≤ a).
Proof. Let for every α < κ fα ∈ aα be a representative. Consider the set
f = ⊕{fδ | δ < κ},
defined by f(〈α, β〉) = fα(β). This is possible due to the existence of a
bijection between κ and κ× κ. To see that fα is ∆1 definable in f consider
the formula
ϕ(β) = 〈α, β〉 ∈ f.
Obviously this is a defining formula for fα with parameter α.

The last three properties hold in Cκ as well as in Bκ by the same proof,
so we just state them in a lemma.
Lemma 4.0.36 (DCκ), (κ =
<κ2)
a) For every degree a ∈ Cκ there is a degree b ∈ Cκ, such that a < b,
b) for every degree a ∈ Cκ |a| ≤ κ,
c) for every sequence of Turing degrees a1, a2, · · · , aα, · · · with α < κ in
Cκ, there exists a Turing degree a in Cκ, such that
∀α < κ(aα ≤ a).
Proof: Same as in lemma 4.0.33 , lemma 4.0.34 and lemma 4.0.35 .

The notion of a cone of Turing degrees is well-known from Martin’s proof
that AD implies the existence of a measurable cardinal. We are going to do
a similar style proof later, and here we just give the definition.
Notation 4.0.37 For f ∈ Bκ write
Kκ(f) = {[g]κ | f ≤T g}.
For f ∈ Cκ write
K2(f) = {[g]2 | f ≤T g}.
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Definition 4.0.38 A set A of Turing degrees in Bκ (resp. Cκ) is a cone in
Bκ (Cκ) if there is an f ∈ Bκ (resp. Cκ), such that A = Kκ(f)(resp.K2(f)).
For f ∈ Bκ we call Kκ(f) the cone determined by [f ]κ and similarly for
f ∈ Cκ and K2(f).
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5 Games of length κ
In this section we define two-player games of length κ on κκ and on κ2 for
a regular cardinal κ. After that we state the axioms we will be investigat-
ing. The context in which the usual AD is defined is easily obtained by
substituting ω for κ everywhere.
5.1 Games and Strategies
5.1.1 The game Gκκ(A)
Let κ be a regular cardinal and A be a subset of κκ which will be called
the payoff set. The game Gκκ(A) features two players which we call I and
II, who cooperate to construct a sequence f ∈ κκ step by step, where I
plays at even steps and II at odd. Here step by step means, that first I
plays some ordinal which is interpreted as f(0), then II plays some ordinal
which is interpreted as f(1) and so on, until the order type of the constructed
sequence reaches κ.
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I II
f(0)
f(1)
f(2)
. .
. .
. .
f(α)
f(α + 1)
. .
. .
. .
(Fig. 1)
α < κ even
At each point in time the players have complete information for the run
of the game up to that point(e.g. before playing f(ω2 + 43), II can see what
I has played as f(ω + 2), or what he himself has played as f(17), etc.). We
note that I plays first at limits (since limit ordinals are considered even). We
will denote by fI the moves of player I and by fII the moves of player II:
fI = 〈f(α) | α < κ, α even〉,
fII = 〈f(α) | α < κ, α odd〉.
After the game is finished it is tested whether the resulting sequence
f belongs to A. If this is the case, then I wins, otherwise II wins. So,
intuitively the goal of I is to ”get into A”, while the goal of II is to ”keep
out of A” (or equivalently to ”get into κκ− A”). Intuitively still, a strategy
is an algorithm, which given the course of the game up to any point tells a
player what move to play next.
Thus two ways to look at a strategy σ for I are:
A) As a function:
σ :
⋃
α<κ, α even
κα → κ
B) As a tree on κ:
σ ⊆ <κκ, σ closed under initial segments
with the additional properties:
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1. if α is even and 〈γ0, . . . , γα〉 ∈ σ, then for every η < κ,
〈γ0, . . . , γα, η〉 ∈ σ,
and
2. if α is odd and 〈γ0, . . . , γα〉 ∈ σ, then there is exactly one η < κ,
such that
〈γ0, . . . , γα, η〉 ∈ σ.
It is not hard to see that A) and B) are basically the same thing, and if
ever for some technical purpose it is important which one we consider, we will
state it explicitly. Also it is obvious from B) that |{σ|σ is a strategy for I}| ≤
|P(<κκ)|, so if there is a bijection between <κκ and κ, we can code strategies
by members of κκ. Further it is clear how to define the notion of a strategy
for II.
Definition 5.1.1 A play (or a run) of the game Gκκ(A) is a member g of
κκ. A partial play (or a partial run, or a valid position) of the game Gκκ(A)
is a member g of <κκ.
Intuitively, a partial play g ∈ λκ for some ordinal λ < κ is just a sequence
produced by the first λ moves the players have made, and is to be extended
to an f ∈ κκ in order to finish the game. Given a partial play g ∈ λκ it is
clear whose turn it is to play based on the parity of the ordinal λ.
Definition 5.1.2 Let σ be a strategy for I in the game Gκκ(A). A play of
the game (produced) according to σ is a sequence 〈gα | α < κ〉, where for
every even ordinal δ < κ,
σ(〈gα | α < δ〉) = gδ.
If 〈g(α) | α < κ〉 is such a play we denote it by σ∗y, where y = 〈gα | α odd 〉.
A partial play (or a partial run, or a valid position) of the game according
to σ is a sequence 〈gα | α < β〉, where β < κ and for every even ordinal δ < β
σ(〈gα | α < δ〉) = gδ.
If 〈g(α) | α < β〉 is such a play we denote it by σ∗y, where y = 〈gα | α odd 〉.
For τ a strategy for II, and x ∈ <κκ∪ κκ, x∗ τ has the natural corresponding
meaning.
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Next comes the definition of a winning strategy. The idea is obvious - if a
player has a winning strategy and plays according to it, he always wins no
matter what the other player plays.
Definition 5.1.3 Let A ⊆ κκ. A strategy σ for I in the game Gκκ(A) is
winning, if for every g ∈ κκ,
σ ∗ g ∈ A.
A strategy τ for II is winning, if for every f ∈ κκ
f ∗ τ ∈ κκ− A.
Now it is obviously impossible for the two players to simultaneously have
winning strategies for one game: suppose σ is winning for I and τ for II
in the game Gκκ(A) for some A ∈ κκ, suppose f = σ ∗ g, where g is a play
according to τ . Then f ∈ A ∩ (κκ− A) = ∅.
During the course of the game it might happen, that a position is reached,
from where onwards one of the players has a winning strategy. The precise
formulation follows.
Definition 5.1.4 A valid position g ∈ λκ in the game Gκκ(A) is a winning
position for I if:
a) λ is even and I has a winning strategy in the game Gκκ(B), where
B = {f ∈ κκ | g_f ∈ A}
or
b) λ is odd and for every α < κ, I has a winning strategy in the game
Gκκ(C), where
C = {f ∈ κκ | g_〈α〉_f ∈ A}.
A point to note in this definition is the following. If we were discussing
games in the special situation of κ = ω, then point b) above, could have
been reformulated to ”λ is odd (i.e. an odd number) and II has a winning
strategy in the game Gωω(
ωω − B), where B = {f ∈ ωω | g_f ∈ A}”. That
would have meant intuitively, that player I of the original game starts to act
as player II in the game Gωω(
ωω − B), because now II (from the original
game) has to make the first move. This is possible to do in the special case
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κ = ω only because there are no limit cases to consider. If we want to
generalize such a definition to arbitrary regular cardinals we run into the
problem that the player who wants to get out of the payoff set (player II)
plays first at limits, which contradicts our definition of a game.
We define now, based on a fixed game Gκκ(A) the partial games Gλκ(A) for
ordinals λ < κ. This is the point where the asymmetry in the definition of a
game (pointed out in the preceding paragraph) becomes even more obvious
- the two players will have goals of different nature - I will try to win, and
II will try not to lose.
Definition 5.1.5 Let A ⊆ κκ and λ be an ordinal smaller than κ. The
game Gλκ(A) is defined as follows: the two players cooperate in constructing
a sequence g ∈ λκ. Player I wins if g is a winning position for him in the
game Gκκ(A), otherwise player II wins.
Note that we could have defined winning positions for player II in a similar
way as we did for player I. Also we could have defined respective partial
games, where II tries to win and I tries not to lose. It will become clear,
however, after we state the axiom of weak determinacy, that since I is priv-
ileged by the above asymmetry, that if we had stated a similar axiom with
the roles of I and II interchanged, it would just have been a corollary of
ours.
5.1.2 The game Gκ2(A)
Here again κ is a regular cardinal, this time the payoff set A is a subset of
κ2. The entire previous section can be translated in the new context by just
requiring the players to play numbers in the set 2 = {0, 1} instead of ordinals
smaller than κ. Here we show that every such game can be seen as a game
on κκ and vice versa under mild requirements.
The idea is that we add the rule ”whoever plays anything bigger than 1
loses”. So let A ⊆ κ2. Pick B ⊆ κκ with
B = A ∪ {f ∈ κκ | ∃α < κ(α odd ∧ f(α) > 1 ∧ ∀δ < α(f(δ) ≤ 1))}.
Now if I has a winning strategy σ in Gκ2(A), he can apply the same strategy
to win Gκκ(B) : if II plays anything bigger than 1, I wins automatically,
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otherwise respond according to σ. Similarly for II - there we didn’t need to
modify the payoff set to favor II more, since if I plays outside of {0, 1} he
loses automatically.
For the converse, if I has a winning strategy for the game Gκκ(B), it
must surely deal with the situation where II plays only zeroes and ones, so
it is automatically contains a winning strategy for Gκ2(A), as a subset, and
similarly for a winning strategy for II.
For the other direction we require a bijection between <κ2 and κ, so that
bounded subsets of κ can be coded by ordinals in κ. The idea is that we can
code the initial segments of an f ∈ κκ in such a way that initial segments
appear before their extensions and also initial segments of even length are
coded by even ordinals and initial segments of odd length are coded by odd
ordinals. We construct then a g ∈ κ2, corresponding to f , so that g(α) = 1 if
α codes an initial segment of f and g(α) = 0 otherwise. We can now encode
each element of a payoff set A ⊆ κκ in this way; call the resulting subset
of κ2 B. Let Gκ2(B
∗) be the game for B with the added requirement that
whoever plays something which is not a code for a superset of the sequence
thus far constructed loses automatically.
Now if I has a winning strategy for Gκκ(A), he can just play Gκ2(B
∗) by
decoding each of his prescribed moves, and putting 1 in the desired place -
the properties of the coding guarantee that this would be a winning strategy
for B.The case for II is the same. The converse follows in a similar way. We
will not write everything down as explicitly as above, but it is clear that the
following is true.
Proposition 5.1.6 Assume |<κ2| = κ. Then for every A ⊆ κκ, there is a
B ⊆ κ2, such that I (resp. II) has a winning strategy in Gκκ(A) if and only
if I (resp. II) has a winning strategy in Gκ2(B). And for every B ⊆ κ2,
there is an A ⊆ κκ, such that I (resp. II) has a winning strategy in Gκ2(B)
if and only if I (resp. II) has a winning strategy in Gκκ(A).
Corollary 5.1.7 If |<κ2| = κ, then every game Gκκ(A) is determined if and
only if every game Gκ2(B) is determined.
Remark 5.1.8 The above corollary holds for ω, but will be trivially true for
cardinals bigger than ω once we show that it is inconsistent to generalize AD
to bigger cardinals directly.
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Completely analogously to the previous section we define the partial
games for subsets of κ2.
Definition 5.1.9 Let A ⊆ κ2 and λ be an ordinal smaller than κ. The
game Gλ2(A) is defined as follows: the two players cooperate in constructing
a sequence g ∈ λ2. Player I wins if g is a winning position for him in the
game Gκ2(A), otherwise player II wins.
Here the definition of a winning position is the same as in 5.1.4.
5.1.3 The games G∗∗κκ(A) and G∗κκ(A)
For an A ⊆ κκ, the ∗∗-gameG∗∗κκ(A) is played by the following rules. Instead
of ordinals, the players play increasing bounded sequences of ordinals smaller
than κ.
I II
s0
s1
s2
. .
. .
. .
sα
sα+1
. .
. .
. .
(Fig. 2)
α < κ even
For each α < κ, sα ∈ <κκ, sα )
⋃
δ<α sδ (no ”pass”-moves are allowed). sα
is the α-th move in the game, it is played by I if α is even and by II if α is
odd. Note that since κ is required to be regular | ⋃δ<α sδ |< κ for all α < κ.
Put
s :=
⋃
α<κ
sα.
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Obviously s ∈ κκ, the winning condition is the same: I wins if s ∈ A, II
wins if s ∈ κκ− A.
The ∗-game G∗κκ(A) has ’hybrid’ rules - I plays bounded sequences and II
plays ordinals.
I II
s0
γ1
s2
. .
. .
. .
sα
γα+1
. .
. .
. .
(Fig. 3)
α < κ even
For each odd α < κ γα ∈ κ, for even α < κ, sα ∈ <κκ, sα ⊇
⋃
δ<α,δ even sδ _
αδ+1 (we allow empty moves for player I). Put
s :=
⋃
α<κ,α even
sα.
I wins if s ∈ A, II wins if s ∈ κκ− A.
5.2 Some observations
5.2.1 Finite games
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Fact 5.2.1 Every finite game is determined.
This almost does not require proof - if it is not true that there exists a move
for I, such that for every move by II, there exists a move for I, ..., for every
move by II (there exists a move for I such that) something holds, then for
every move by I there exists a move for II such that for every move by I, ...
, there exists a move for II such that (for every move by I) the reverse holds
- where the dots stand for a finite amount of words - just the usual way in
which quantified logical expressions are negated.
5.2.2 Games of length ω
We give here three well known facts ([3]):
Fact 5.2.2 (AC) There exists an A ⊆ (ω2), such that the game Gω2(A) is
not determined .
Fact 5.2.3 (AC) For every closed or open A ⊆ (ω2), the game Gω2(A) is
determined .
Fact 5.2.4 (AC) For every closed or open A ⊆ (ωω), the game Gωω(A) is
determined .
5.2.3 Games of length κ
We give a generalization of Fact 5.2.3 for arbitrary weakly compact cardinals.
We will see why this is in fact a generalization in the next section.
Proposition 5.2.5 (DCκ) If κ is weakly compact, κ = 2
<κ, A ⊆ (κ2) is
κ-open, then the following property holds: If one of the players has winning
strategies for all games Gα2(A) where α is an ordinal smaller than κ, then
this player has a winning strategy in the whole game Gκ2(A).
Proof. We consider the two possible cases:
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Case I) Player I has winning strategies in the partial games. In this case we
have actually allowed more than enough. A winning strategy for I for
even one of the games Gα2(A) is enough to guarantee him a winning
strategy in the whole game (c.f. Definitions 5.1.5, 5.1.4)
Case II) Player II has winning strategies. For each α let τα be a winning strat-
egy for for II for Gα2(A), whose existence is assumed. Now for each
δ < α τα includes a winning strategy for II for the game Gδ2(A), which
we call τ δα. Observe that
τ δα = τα  δ.
Now consider the space Φ of all winning strategies for the partial games
that II has, equipped with the following relation: If δ < α < κ, τ is a
winning strategy for Gδ2(A) , σ is a winning strategy for Gα2(A) and
τ ⊂ σ write τ ≺ σ. We will show that
(*) (Φ,≺) is in fact a κ-tree:
Proof of (*): If τα is a winning strategy for Gα2(A), then {τ δα | δ < α}
is obviously well-ordered by ≺. Φ certainly has a member on each level
below κ. To see that each level is of cardinality smaller than κ proceed
by induction as follows. Level 0 is obviously of cardinality smaller than
κ, if α is even and τα is a winning strategy for Gα2(A), then there are
finitely many (four) possible ways to ”prescribe an extension to level
α + 2” for each member of α2 reached via playing in accordance with
τα - now the α + 2’nd level of Φ will have size smaller than κ by the
induction hypothesis, regularity and inaccessibility of κ. For α limit
observe that |Φ<α| = δ for some δ < κ, now as each member of Φα
is a union of members of Φ<α and the induction is finished once we
compute that there are at most 2δ such unions, which is smaller than
κ by inaccessibility. (*)
Now we apply the weak compactness of κ to get a cofinal branch of Φ
B = {τα | α < κ}.
Obviously σ =
⋃
B is a strategy for II in Gκ2(A). To see that σ is
winning consider the play g = f ∗ σ, where f = 〈fα | α even〉. Now for
every α < κ there is a gα ∈ κ2 − A with gα  α = g  α - otherwise
g  α would be a winning position for I - in fact every strategy would
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be winning for him from there on. Now we apply 2.0.3 with κ2−A and
{gα}α<κ to see that g /∈ A.

Note that we could get a similar result for closed A above only if reverse
the roles of I and II - i.e. we should redefine the partial games so that II
plays in them for a win in the whole game, while I plays not to lose, and
suppose that I has winning strategies in all of them. Note also that we could
not generalize 5.2.4 in this way if we tried, because the tree Φ from the proof
could have big (of cardinality ≥ κ) levels in this case.
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6 The Axioms Of Weak Determinacy
Having gathered all the relevant definitions in the previous sections we are
ready to proceed with the axioms.
6.1 Motivation
The usual axiom of determinacy has the following statement in our context.
(AD) For every A ⊆ ωω the game Gωω(A) is determined.
Before we see that the outright generalization from ω to κ is inconsistent
let us state it.
For κ a regular cardinal.
(ADκ) For every A ⊆ κκ the game Gκκ(A) is determined.
The following is straight-forward.
Remark 6.1.1 If λ > κ, ADλ implies ADκ.
Proof. Let A ⊆ κκ. In order to prove that A is determined consider the
set B = {f ∈ λλ | f  κ ∈ A} ∪ {f ∈ λλ | ∃α < κ(α odd ∧ f(α) ≥ κ ∧ ∀β <
α(f(β) < κ))}. By ADλ Gλλ(B) is determined, so let σ be a winning strategy
for one of the players. Then it is trivial to obtain from σ a winning strategy
for the same player in the game Gκκ(A).

By the above remark to show the inconsistency of ADκ for all uncountable
cardinals we only need to show the inconsistency of ADω1 . The following fact
will help us establish this.
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Proposition 6.1.2 (Mycielski) If AD holds, then there is no injection
from ω1 into
ωω.
Proposition 6.1.3 (Mycielski) ¬ADω1
Proof. Put
A = {f ∈ω1 ω1 | f(0) ≥ ω and fII  ω is not a bijection with f(0) }.
Consider the game Gω1ω1(A). Obviously the moves after ω don’t matter. Also
obvious is that since countable ordinals are played I cannot have a winning
strategy in the game. So assuming ADω1 II has a winning strategy σ. But
now using σ it is easy to define an injection from ω1 into
ωω - contradiction
with 6.1.2!

Altogether we have.
Fact 6.1.4 ADκ is inconsistent for κ > ω.
So this obvious generalization of AD fails and we will have to consider
weaker versions of it. We mentioned in the introduction, that a motivation
inspired by Proposition 5.2.5 and based on winning conditions for the partial
games does seem unlikely to be consistent with DCκ. We will now discuss
this point in some more detail.
The direct generalization based on 5.2.5 was called AWDκ in the intro-
duction. We will now show that final segment determinacy - a principle
strictly weaker than AWDκ implies ¬AD. As sketched in the introduction
this will lead us to abandon the idea of using AWDκ.
Definition 6.1.5 For A ⊆ κκ the game Gκκ(A) depends on a final segment
if either I has a winning strategy for it or no valid position is a winning
position for him (the ’or’ is naturally exclusive, since if the first clause is
true ∅ is a winning position for I).
(FSκ) If the game Gκκ(A) depends on a final segment, it is determined.
It is easy to see that AWDκ (even if it were consistent) would be stronger
than FSκ, since if the game depends on a final segment, every strategy would
win the partial games for II, unless I had a strategy from the start.
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Lemma 6.1.6 If κ > ω, then FSκ ⇒ ¬AD.
Proof. Consider the game G, which is defined as follows. If I plays on his
first move an ordinal that is not in the set {α | ω ≤ α < ω1}, then he loses.
Otherwise let δ be the first move of I. In order to win the game II now has
to ensure that there is some ordinal γ, such that for every limit ordinal λ > γ
the next ω moves of II represent a bijection with δ. It is easy to see that
I does not have a winning position in this game, so by FSκ II must have a
winning strategy but now we can proceed as in 6.1.3.

Remark 6.1.7 We could try to reformulate FSκ by switching the roles of I
and II, i.e. by postulating that if II has no winning position, then I has a
winning strategy. Another possible reformulation is to consider games played
just with members of {0, 1}, i.e. producing a member of Cκ as a resuling
sequence. It is not hard to see however that these two reformulations actually
yield equivalent axioms.
We turn now to the generalizations of the axioms of ∗, ∗∗ and Turing
determinacy which we are actually going to use. As we are going to see, in
the case κ = ω all of them follow from the axiom FSω.
6.2 ∗ and ∗∗ determinacy
The intuition behind the fact that final segment determinacy implies deter-
minacy of the ∗ and ∗∗ games when κ = ω is that if I has any winning
position in a game of one of these two kinds, he can just directly jump to it
on his first move, which means that he has a winning strategy for the game,
the other alternative is that he has no winning position at all and this is
when FSω comes into play.
(AWD∗κ) For every A ⊆ κκ game G∗κκ(A) is determined.
(AWD∗∗κ ) For every A ⊆ κκ game G∗∗κκ(A) is determined.
(AWD∗2κ) For every A ⊆ κ2 game G∗κ2(A) is determined.
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(AWD∗∗2κ) For every A ⊆ κ2 game G∗∗κ2(A) is determined.
Let us point out here that if we try to derive one of these axiom from
another one we run in the following trouble. The usual strategy that one
employs in similar situations is to modify the payoff set by including a con-
dition of the sort ”whoever does something first loses”, now the trouble with
that sort of argument is that in these games we cannot reconstruct the run
of the game based on the resulting sequence, because at least one of the
players (I) can always make arbitrarily long moves, so given say an f ∈ Cω
produced by a ∗-game the only certain thing is that f(0) is chosen by I. We
are later going to derive some implications, however these will require strong
additional assumptions.
Proposition 6.2.1 FSω +DC imply:
i) AWD∗ω,
ii) AWD∗∗ω ,
iii) AWD∗2ω,
iv) AWD∗∗2ω.
Proof. Let g be a bijection between ω and <ωω, such that each member of
<ωω appears unboundedly many times in the enumeration g, and h a bijection
between ω and <ω2 where each member of <ω2 appears unboundedly often.
The existence of these functions is guaranteed by DC. The unboudedness
requirements above serve to ensure that under appropriate rules of the game
the players cannot ”make an illegal move”. The alternative would have been
to add a rule that whoever plays a code of a set that doesnt adhere to
the ∗ (respectively ∗∗) rules loses. Then however the game would not have
depended on a final segment formally, so this is just a technical trick.
For i) suppose A ⊆ ωω. The function ∗ : ωω → ωω, which we define by
recursion, maps a sequence of moves to the sequence resulting in translating
the moves in terms of a ∗-game, i.e. applying g on the moves taking care
that every move is a superset of the union of the preceding moves and that
the moves of II increase the size by exactly 1 :
f ∗ := ∗(f) = 〈f ∗(n) | n < ω〉,
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where for n even
f ∗(n) = g(β(f(n), n)),
where for all i, j,
β(i, j) = ” the smallest β ≥ i with ”g(β) ⊇
⋃
k<j
f ∗(k)”,
and for n odd
f ∗(α) =
⋃
k<n
f ∗(k) ∪ {f(n)}.
Now put
A∗ = {f ∗ | f ∈ A}.
It is clear that player I has a winning strategy in Gωω(A
∗) iff I has a
winning strategy in G∗ωω(A). The same thing is clear also for II, so it only
remains to check that Gωω(A
∗) depends on a final segment. To this end
suppose that I has no winning strategy in the full game and suppose that he
has a winning position p ∈n ω with strategy σ. We have two cases:
A) Even(n) then a winning strategy τ for I in Gωω(A
∗) can be easily
constructed, with
τ(∅) = ”a g-index for
⋃
k≤n
∗(p(k))”,
τ(x) = σ(x), for x 6= ∅.
B) Odd(α) Similar to A).
Contradiction! The other points are proved similarly.

6.3 Turing determinacy
The other axiom we are going to consider corresponds to the Turing deter-
minacy axiom known for the case κ = ω.
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Let us first observe how the game for a single Turing degree is easily
determined in ZFC with II having a winning strategy. To get the intuition
we restrict for a second our attention to the case κ = ω. Now whatever the
Turing degree I is aiming for, II can just play a sequence of a higher degree
and regardless of the moves of I, II wins.
DCκ and an easy cardinality argument allow us to get a generalization.
Proposition 6.3.1 (DCκ) If κ = 2
<κ and f ∈ Bκ, player II has a winning
strategy in Gκκ([f ]).
Proof. We first prove a claim.
(*) There is a g ∈ Bκ, such that g is not Σ1-definable in 〈Hκ,∈, f〉.
To see this note that the set of all formulas is countable and that the
possible parameters come from Hκ, which by 4.0.22 has cardinality κ. By
Cantor’s theorem not every element of Bκ can be defined in this way.
By (∗) chose a g ∈ Bκ with g T f . Define a strategy σ for II as follows:
For α = λ+ n, n odd, λ limit, x ∈ ακ,
σ(x) = g(λ+ (n+ 1)/2− 1).
It is now left to see that σ is indeed winning. To this end assume that
for some y ∈ κκ h = y ∗ σ ≤T f . This means that there is a Σ1 formula ϕ
with parameters from Hκ and a Π1 formula ψ with parameters from Hκ, so
that the following holds:
〈Hκ,∈, f〉 |= ϕ(〈x, y〉)
iff
〈Hκ,∈, f〉 |= ψ(〈x, y〉)
iff
〈x, y〉 ∈ h.
From here we can easily obtain a ∆1 in 〈Hκ,∈, f〉 definition of g - consider
say for Π1 the formula
χ(〈x, y〉) = Ordinal(x) ∧ x ∈ κ∧
∃λ < x∃n ∈ ω(Limit(λ) ∧ x = λ+ n ∧ ψ(〈λ+ 2n+ 1, y〉)).
Contradiction!

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Remark 6.3.2 It is quite probable that the proposition above is not optimal
with respect to minimality of assumptions. We are not going to be bothered
by this however, as it is not a part of the main development.
Remark 6.3.3 Under suitable assumptions on κ the proposition also holds
for boundedly many Turing degrees by taking a member of a degree higher
than the join of all of them
That determinacy holds for arbitrary sets of Turing degrees however is not
provable under standard set theoretical assumptions. For the case κ = ω it
is a known result of Woodin that in L(R) it is equivalent to full determinacy.
In our general setting we are not going to attempt a generalization of this
result, but at least we state the axiom officially and prove that as for ∗ and
∗∗ determinacy FSω implies Turing determinacy.
(TDκ) For every set A of Turing degrees in κκ the game Gκκ(
⋃A) is
determined.
(TD2κ) For every set A of Turing degrees in κ2 the game Gκ2(
⋃A) is
determined.
We prove first a basic property of the Bκ and Cκ Turing degrees - every
two sequences which agree on a final segment lie in the same degree.
Proposition 6.3.4 a) If f , g ∈ Bκ and there exists an α < κ, such that
for every γ > α, f(γ) = g(γ), then f ≡T g.
b) If f , g ∈ Cκ and there exists an α < κ, such that for every γ > α,
f(γ) = g(γ), then f ≡T g.
Proof. a) Let f and g be as in a). We are going to show g ≤T f , the other
direction being similar. Let α be such that for every γ > α, g(α) = f(α).
Put
p = g  (α + 1).
The idea now is to use p as parameter in order to find a ∆1 definition of g in
〈Hκ,∈, f〉. Of course for this to work p has to be a member of Hκ, but this
is immediate as p is a set of pairs of ordinals, smaller than κ. We proceed
now with the defining formula:
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ϕ(〈x, y〉) = Ordinal(x) ∧ Ordinal(y)∧
((x ≤ α ∧ 〈x, y〉 ∈ p) ∨ (α < x ∧ 〈x, y〉 ∈ f)).
The parameters in this definition are α and p (and α can be defined from p
in a ”Σ0 way”) and obviously belong to Hκ. The formula ϕ is even Σ0, so
g ≤T f .
The proof of b) is similar.

Proposition 6.3.5 (DC) FSω → TD
Proof. Suppose A is a set of Turing degrees in the Baire space. Put
A =
⋃A. What we are going to show is that the game Gωω(A) depends on
a final segment and is thus determined by FSω. Consider the two cases:
a) I has a winning strategy in Gωω(A).
In this case the game depends on a final segment by definition.
b) I has no winning strategy in Gωω(A).
In this case what we have to show is that I has no winning position.
Assume that g ∈ nω is a winning position for I. Put
B = {f ∈ ωω | g_f ∈ A}
and let τ be a winning strategy for I in the game Gωω(B). We are going
to show that ∅ is a winning position for I thus reaching contradiction.
The idea for constructing a winning strategy for I is simple - play
the first n moves arbitrarily and then start following τ . The resulting
sequence h will have the following property:
t = g_(h− h  n+ 1) ∈ a,
for some degree a in A. However now t and h agree on a final segment,
so, according to 6.3.4, h is also in a and thus in
⋃A.
Formally a strategy σ for I will look like this.
For m ≤ n odd and q ∈ mω,
σ(q) = 0,
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for m > n odd and q ∈ mω,
σ(q) = τ(q − q  n).

Later we are going to see that under standard assumptions TDκ and TD
2
κ
are actually equivalent for arbitrary κ.
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7 Consequences
Both of the consequences that we present in this section will follow from
FSκ, together with the choice requirement DCκ in the case κ = ω.
7.1 Measurability of κ+
We start with the generalization of the remarkable observation by Martin,
that under AD every set of Turing degrees contains a cone, or is disjoint from
a cone. We isolate this property as an axiom for both spaces Cκ and Bκ and
then show the equivalence.
Notation 7.1.1 Let DκT denote the set of all Turing degrees in Bκ. Let D2T
denote the set of all Turing degrees in Cκ.
(CCCκ) For A a set of Turing degrees in Cκ either A or D2T −A contains a
cone.
(CCBκ) For A a set of Turing degrees in Bκ either A or DκT −A contains a
cone.
Lemma 7.1.2 CCCκ ⇐⇒ CCBκ
Proof. Denote the isomorphism from lemma 4.0.32 by Θ : DκT → D2T .
Now for the direction from left to right suppose A ⊆ Bκ. Consider now the
set
E = {Θ(a) | a ∈ A}.
Now E is a set of Turing degrees in Cκ and by CCCκ either it or its comple-
ment contain a cone, and so when we apply Θ−1 we get that either A or its
complement contain a cone.

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Lemma 7.1.3 (κ = <κ2, DCκ)
a) TDκ ⇐⇒ CCBκ,
b) TD2κ ⇐⇒ CCCκ,
c) TDκ ⇐⇒ TD2κ.
Proof:
a) →) Put A = ⋃A. Now by TDκ the game Gκκ(A) is determined. We
consider the two possible cases.
Case 1: Player I has a winning strategy, say σ.
As we noted in section 5 we can regard strategies as members of Bκ.
Now consider for an arbitrary h ∈ Bκ the composition σ ∗ h. As σ is
winning for I this composition is always in A. The only thing left to
see now is that for every h ∈ Bκ, such that σ ≤T h, h ≤T σ ∗ h. Thus
we have Kκ(σ) ⊆ A.
Case 2: Player II has a winning strategy, say τ .
By a similar argument in this case Kκ(τ) ⊆ DκT −A.
←) Let A be a set of Turing degrees in Bκ. By CCBκ either A or DκT − A
contains a cone. Suppose the former is true and say K = Kκ(f) ⊆ A. Now
I has an easy winning strategy σ in Gκκ(A) - namely he plays f . Whatever
sequence y is played by II the result σ ∗ y is in ⋃K and thus in ⋃A. The
other case is similar.
b) the same as a).
c) by a), b) and lemma 7.1.2.

The next well-known definition is given for completeness.
Definition 7.1.4 Let X be a set and λ a cardinal. A Filter F on X is
λ-complete, if for every O ⊆ F , such that |O| < λ, ⋂O ∈ F .
Martin’s filter is defined in the same way as in the classical recursion
theory.
Notation 7.1.5 Let MκT = {A ⊆ DκT | A contains a cone } be Martin’s
filter over DκT .
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Lemma 7.1.6 (TDκ, κ = 2
<κ, DCκ) M
κ
T is a κ
+-complete.
Proof. That MκT is a filter is easy to see. That it is an ultrafilter follows
by lemma 7.1.3. The κ+-completeness follows by lemma 4.0.35.

Theorem 7.1.7 (TDκ, κ = 2
<κ, DCκ) κ
+ is measurable.
Proof. We are going to convert the κ+-complete ultrafilter MκT to a κ
+-
complete ultrafilter over κ+. To this end consider the function g : DκT → κ+,
defined by
g(a) = sup{‖ f ‖| f ∈ a},
where ‖ . ‖ is any coding of ordinals below κ+ by members of Bκ. Now for
each a ∈ DκT g(a) < κ+ by lemma 4.0.34 and by the fact that κ+ is regular.
Finally consider
U = {U ⊆ κ+ | ∃A ∈MκT (U = g′′A)}.
To see that U is nontrivial we use lemma 4.0.33.

7.2 ∗-determinacy and the perfect set property
In this section we show that AWD∗2κ is equivalent to every subset of Cκ and
Bκ being strongly psp. The argument is similar to the argument for the case
κ = ω, where the conclusion is derived first for the Cantor space and then
transferred to the Baire space via a coding map.
Lemma 7.2.1 Every subset of Cκ is strongly psp iff every subset of Bκ is
strongly psp.
Proof. For the direction from right to left one just consults the definition
and uses that Cκ is a subspace of Bκ. For the other direction it is enough to
see that every subset of Bκ is κ-homeomorphic to a subset of Cκ. The idea
from the case κ = ω can be used here as well.
For f ∈ Bκ define we f ∗ ∈ Cκ as follows. For every two ordinals α, β if α
is even let tα,β ∈ β+12 with
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i) for γ < β, tα,β(γ) = 1, and
ii) tα,β(β) = 0.
If α is odd we take tα,β ∈ β+12 dually with
i) for γ < β, tα,β(γ) = 0, and
ii) tα,β(β) = 1.
Finally put
f ∗ = t0,f(0) _ t1,f(1) · · · tγ,f(γ) _ · · · , for γ < κ.
It is easy to see that ∗ : Bκ → C is a homeomorphism, where C ⊆ Cκ.

Now we provide the actual game characterization.
Lemma 7.2.2 (κ = 2<κ) Let A ⊆ κ2.
a) II has a winning strategy in G∗κ2(A) iff |A| ≤ κ.
b) I has a winning strategy in G∗κ2(A) iff A has a strongly perfect subset.
Proof. a) Suppose σ is a winning strategy for II. Let for this proof a
good position be a sequene s = 〈sδ | δ < α〉, where α is even, such that s is
played according to the rules of the ∗-games and the moves of II are played
according to σ. For s such a position let s∗ = ∪δ<αsδ.
(*) Let f ∈ κ2. If for every good position p, such that p∗ ⊆ f there exists
a t ⊇ p∗ with σ(p_〈t〉) ⊆ f , then f /∈ A.
Proof of (*). Since ∅ is a good position we can recursively construct good
positions p0 ⊆ p1 ⊆ . . . pα ⊆ . . . with α < κ. Now we have ∪α<κp∗α = f . Since
all p′αs are played according to σ and σ is winning for II we have f /∈ A.
Now define for every good position p = 〈pδ | δ < α〉
Fp = {f ∈ κ2 | p∗ ⊆ f ∧ ∀t ⊇ p∗(σ(p_〈t〉)6⊆f)}.
Now because of (∗) we have that A ⊆ ⋃p good Fp. Since the number of good
positions is at most κ by (κ = 2<κ) we would be ready if we can show that
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|Fp| = 1. But this is easy, since for each f ∈ Fp and each α < κ f(α) is
uniquely determined by p.
For the converse suppose that A ⊆ Cκ and |A| ≤ κ. Let 〈fα | α < κ〉 be
an enumeration of A. Now a strategy σ for II can easily be constructed by
making sure at step α that the resulting sequence will differ from fα.
b) Let σ be a winning strategy for I. Consider the set P = {σ∗y | y ∈ κ2}.
P ⊆ A because σ is winning, |P | = 2κ and P is easily seen to be strongly
perfect.
Conversely let P ⊆ X be strongly perfect. By the proof of lemma 3.0.19
P = [T ], where T is perfect and < κ-closed. Now at each successor move I
can stay on the tree because the tree is perfect and limit stages go through
with < κ-closedness.

Corollary 7.2.3 (κ = 2<κ) AWD∗2κ ⇒ every subset of Cκ is strongly psp as
is every subset of Bκ .
Proof. By 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.

7.3 ∗∗-determinacy and κ-meager sets
In this section we show how some results for ∗∗ games known from the case
κ = ω can be generalized. In contrast with the situation for ∗ games and the
perfect set property, it is not clear if one can define a corresponding Baire
property for κ-topologies, which follows from ∗∗-determinacy.
Definition 7.3.1 A subset of Cκ(Bκ) is κ-meager if it is the union of at most
κ-many nowhere dense sets.
Lemma 7.3.2 (κ = <κκ)
i) For A ⊆ Cκ we have A is κ-meager iff II has a winning stragegy in
G∗∗Cκ(A).
ii) For A ⊆ Bκ we have A is κ-meager iff II has a winning stragegy in
G∗∗Bκ(A).
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Proof. i) Suppose first that A is κ-meager. Then A ⊆ ⋃α<κCα, where
each Cα is closed nowhere dense. Then the complements of the Cα’s are open
dense, so at his α’th move II can get in the complement of Cα.
For the other direction suppose that σ is a winning strategy for II. Let
for this proof a good position be a sequene s = 〈sδ | δ < α〉, where α is even,
such that s is played according to the rules of the ∗∗-games and the moves
of II are played according to σ. For s such a position let s∗ = ∪δ<αsδ.
(*) Let f ∈ κ2. If for every good position p, such that p∗ ⊆ f there exists
a t ⊇ p∗ with σ(p_〈t〉) ⊆ f , then f /∈ A.
Proof of (*). Since ∅ is a good position we can recursively construct good
positions p0 ⊆ p1 ⊆ . . . pα ⊆ . . . with α < κ. Now we have ∪α<κp∗α = f . Since
all p′αs are played according to σ and σ is winning for II we have f /∈ A.
Now define for every good position p = 〈pδ | δ < α〉
Fp = {f ∈ κ2 | p∗ ⊆ f ∧ ∀t ⊇ p∗(σ(p_〈t〉)6⊆f)}.
Now because of (∗) we have that A ⊆ ⋃p good Fp. One sees that for each
good position p Np∗−Fp is open dense, so Fp is closed nowhere dense. Finally
by κ = <κ2 there are κ many good positions.
The proof of ii) is the same.

Corollary 7.3.3 (Baire category theorem for Cκ, Bκ) Cκ and Bκ are not
κ-meager (with their respective topologies).
Proof. II obviously cannot have a winning strategy in G∗∗Cκ(Cκ) or in
G∗∗Bκ(Bκ).

Looking at the above corollary one might think that the Baire property
can be made to hold for all sets by an appropriate assumption (like ∗∗-
determinacy). We will show now that if κ is regular this is impossible. First
we define the κ-Baire property generalizing directly the κ = ω case.
Definition 7.3.4
i) A subset of Cκ has the κ-Baire property if there is an open set B ⊆ Cκ,
such that
A4B = {f ∈ Cκ | f ∈ A ∧ f /∈ B} ∪ {f ∈ Cκ | f ∈ B ∧ f /∈ A}
is κ-meager.
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ii) A subset of Bκ has the κ-Baire property if there is an open set B ⊆ Bκ,
such that A4B is κ-meager.
Lemma 7.3.5 If κ is a regular uncountable cardnial, then there are subsets
of Cκ and Bκ that do not have the κ-Baire property.
Proof. We will only treat the case of Cκ since the other case is similar.
Consider the set
A = {f ∈ Cκ | there is a closed unbounded C ⊆ κ,
such that for everyα ∈ C, f(α) = 0}.
To show that A does not have the κ-Baire property let B be an arbitrary
open set. A winning strategy σ for I in the game G∗∗Cκ(A4B) can be described
as follows. Let s ∈ <κ2 be such that Ns ⊆ B. Now we define
σ(∅) = s
σ(t) = t_{1} for t ) ∅.
Now since I moves first at limits, for each h ∈ Cκ produced according to σ
the set {α | h(α) = 1} is a closed unbounded subset of κ, so f ∈ B − A.

One can try to avoid the above difficulty by defining dual ∗∗-games where
at limit stages II moves first and then define a subset of Cκ to be weakly
κ-meager iff II wins the corresponding game. It turns out however that this
notion has the drawback that the weakly κ-meager sets do not form an ideal.
We conclude with a lemma, which we will use in the next section.
Lemma 7.3.6 (κ = <κκ)
i) AWD∗∗2κ implies that every non-meager A ⊆ Cκ has a strongly perfect
subset.
ii) AWD∗∗κ implies that every non-meager A ⊆ Bκ has a strongly perfect
subset.
Proof. For i) By ∗∗-determinacy I has a winning strategy σ in G∗∗Cκ(A).
Now the set P = {σ ∗ 〈{y(α)} | α < κ〉 | y ∈ κ2} is easily seen to be strongly
perfect.
Similarly for ii).

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8 A proof of ∗-determinacy from Turing de-
terminacy and ∗∗-determinacy
In this section we need to work with a strong assumption. The general
idea will be to generalize Theorem 1-3 of [8] and then use the results of
section 7.3. One of the main tools of [8] is the forcing notion for collapsing
an inaccessible cardinal to ω1. This forcing notion is used inside an inner
model L[r] where r is a real, so it is important that it is absolute for L[r].
If we were to try and generalize the proof by taking a member f of Cκ
instead of a real, then in L[f ] the forcing notion for collapsing a cardinal to
κ+
L[f ]
would not be absolute for L[f ]. The reason for this is that L[f ] is
not necessarily closed under sequences of length smaller than κ. Therefore,
instead of working with L we will use a model which is a ”hybrid” between
L and the model Cκ introduced in [9], the latter being the smallest inner
model closed under sequences of length smaller than κ.
Unlike L however Cκ does not in general satisfy the axiom of choice (cf.
[10]). In order to guarantee that our ”hybrid” model does satisfy AC we will
have to assume a sufficiently strong choice-like axiom.
(AWCκ) There is a well-ordering of the set {X ⊆ κ+ | |X| < κ}.
Note that the above principle asserts the existence of a well-ordering of
the κ-finite subsets of κ+ in V (the universe) and not in some other inner
model.
In the entire section κ will be a regular cardinal and we will assume that
DCκ and κ =
<κ2 hold.
8.1 The model W κ
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In this section we introduce the model Cκ from [9] and its natural relativiza-
tion to a member of Cκ. Then we proceed with the definition of the model we
are actually going to use. As a basis for comparison we first briefly summarize
the relativized L-hierarchy.
Definition 8.1.1 For a set A.
L0[A] = ∅;
Lα+1[A] = {x ⊆ Lα[A] | x is definable in 〈Lα[A],∈, A ∩ Lα[A]〉};
Lλ[A] =
⋃
α<λ Lα[A], for λ limit.
L[A] =
⋃
α∈Ord Lα[A]; L = L[∅].
Remark 8.1.2 By ”definable” here is meant first order definable with pa-
rameters.
To formally have this definition within our theory (ZF) we assume that
we have formalized set theory within it. This involves a formalization of
the language and of the satisfaction relation for sets (i.e. defining a formula
Sat(x0, ϕ0) which is true iff x0 and ϕ0 are the formalized versions of x and ϕ
and x |= ϕ). After this has been done it is easy to define what the definable
subsets of a given set are.
The definition of Cκ[f ] for f ∈ Cκ is based on a formalization of the
infinitary language Lκκ and of the satisfaction relation for formulas of Lκκ.
Such a formalization can again be made within ZF (cf. [9]). We let f as a
predicate in the formulas, so that we have a relation Satκ(x, ϕ,A, f) which
is true for a tuple (x, ϕ,A, f) iff x ∈ κA, x is eventually 0, ϕ is a formula of
Lκκ with f as an additional predicate and 〈A,∈, A∩ f〉 satisfies ϕ where the
free variables are interpreted as a corresponding initial segment the vector x.
Now we define the corresponding version of the definable subsets of a
given set.
Definition 8.1.3 Let f ∈ Cκ and let A be any set.
Dκ(A, f) = {B ⊆ A | there is an eventually 0 sequence x ∈ κA
and a formula ϕ of Lκκ with f as an additional predicate,
such that B = {b ∈ A | Satκ(b_x, ϕ,A, f)}}.
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Note that this definition runs completely parallel to the one in [9].
The model itself is defined now as follows.
Definition 8.1.4 For f ∈ Cκ.
Cκ0 [f ] = ∅;
Cκα+1[f ] = D
κ(Cκα, f);
Cκλ [f ] =
⋃
α<λC
κ
α[f ], for λ limit.
Cκ[f ] =
⋃
α∈OrdC
κ
α[f ].
Remark 8.1.5 Obviously Cω[f ] = L[f ].
We see now that a choice-like principle stronger than AWCκ provides
well-orderings for all the levels of Cκ.
Lemma 8.1.6 Assume that for every ordinal α the set {X ⊆ α | |X| < κ}
can be well-ordered. Then for every f ∈ Cκ and for every α there is a well-
ordering (in V) of Cκα[f ]
Proof. In the same way one proves AC in L. The regularity of κ assures
that each formula has less than κ free variables. The proof itself proceeds
by transfinite induction on α. By the induction hypothesis in the case ”α→
α + 1” the model Cκα[f ] is well-ordered, which means it is in a bijective
correspondence with some cardinal and so one can use the assumption to
well order all the possible formulas.

The next property is well-known.
Lemma 8.1.7 Let W be an inner model of ZFC and suppose that λ is
measurable (in V). Then W |= ” λ is inaccessible ”.
Proof. For every α < λ if 〈Xδ | δ < ρ〉 is a sequence of distinct subsets of
α, then ρ < λ. Since in W AC holds it follows that in W λ is inaccessible.

With the above in mind we proceed with the definition of the model
W κ[g,R], where g ∈ Cκ and R is the well-ordering of the κ-finite subsets of
κ+, whose existence is guranteed by AWCκ. The idea is that up to level
κ+ + 1 the levels coincide with the levels of Cκ[g,R] and the higher levels are
formed as for L.
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Definition 8.1.8 For f ∈ Cκ, R a well-ordering of {X ⊆ κ+ | |X| < κ}.
W κα [f,R] = C
κ
α[f,R] for α ≤ κ+;
W κα+1[f,R] = {x ⊆ Wα[f,R] | x is definable in
〈Wα[f,R],∈, f, R ∩Wα[f,R]〉} for α ≥ κ+;
W κ[f,R] =
⋃
α∈OrdW
κ
α [f,R], W
κ[R] = W κ[0, R].
The important feature of the model is that it satisfies AC. This is anal-
ogous to lemma 8.1.6, and we are using a weaker assumption.
Lemma 8.1.9 (AWCκ) W
κ[f,R] is an inner model of ZFC and R, f ∈ W κ.
Proof. All axioms except AC hold by the same arguments as for L and
Cκ. AC holds as follows. Sets up to level κ+ + 1 can be well-ordered because
R ∈ W κ[f,R] (note that R comes at a higher level than κ+ + 1 and for this
reason we had to include R as a parameter in the second clause of 8.1.8).
Sets in the upper levels can be well-ordered by the same argument as for L.

From now on we will work under AWCκ with a fixed well-order R of
{X ⊆ κ+ | |X| < κ}. We will write W κ[f ] for W κ[f,R].
Lemma 8.1.10 (AWCκ) For α an ordinal, such that κ ≤ α < κ+ and
f ∈ Cκ
|W κα [f ]| ≤ κ.
Proof. As for Cκ. Note that both κ+ and the cardinality bound obtained
are in the sense of V .

Lemma 8.1.11 (AWCκ) If κ
+ is inaccessible in W κ[f ], then there exists an
ordinal ν < κ+, such that κ2 ∩W κ[f ] ⊆ W κν [f ]
Proof. Immediate, note that κ+ is in the sense of V . 
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8.2 The main proof
As indicated above this will be a modification of the proof of [8]. We start
by giving some background notions.
Definition 8.2.1 Let x be a set. Call a set S x-admissible if 〈S,∈, x ∩ S〉
is a model of the Kriple-Platek set theory where for Σ0-collection and Σ0-
separation we allow x as predicate for the atomic formulas.
Note that if x ∈ S we can replace the above requirement by 〈S,∈〉 |= KP.
Definition 8.2.2 For f ∈ Cκ call the ordinal α f -admissible if α > κ and
W κα [f ] |= KP . Denote the smallest f -admissible ordinal by ωfκ+. ωκ+ denotes
the smallest ordinal β above κ, such that W κβ |= KP .
The Levy Collapse is a well-known notion of forcing for collapsing cardi-
nals to a given regular cardinal. We give some equally well-known properties
in the three lemmata after the definition.
Definition 8.2.3 For λ a regular cardinal and α > λ an ordinal.
Col(λ, α) = {f | f is a function ∧ |f | < λ ∧ dom(f) ⊆ α× λ ∧ rng(f) ⊆ α∧
∀〈β, ξ〉 ∈ dom(f)((β = 0→ f(〈β, ξ〉) = 0) ∧ (β > 0→ f(〈β, ξ〉) < β))},
Pλ is the partial order for adjoining a Cohen generic subset of λ.
Lemma 8.2.4 Let M be admissible and G be M-generic over Col(λ, α) and
β < α. Then
{〈δ, γ〉 | {〈〈β, δ〉, γ〉} ∈ G}
is a surjective map of λ onto β.
Lemma 8.2.5 Col(λ, α) is λ-closed and if α > λ and α is an inaccessible
cardinal, then Col(λ, α) satisfies the α-c.c., thus it preserves cardinals ≤ λ
and cardinals ≥ α.
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Lemma 8.2.6 Let M be admissible and G be an M-generic filter over Col(λ, α),
where α ≥ λ+M . Then α = λ+M [G].
The following construction is a generalization of the construction in [6][III
1.10 - 1.11].
Suppose M,N are admissible, M ⊆ N , and <κM ⊆ M , λ is a regular
cardinal of M and N and λ < α < o(M). Suppose further, that there is an
enumeration in N with length λ of the dense subsets of Col(λ, α)×Col(λ, α)
lying in M .
Then we can construct in N a funcion H : <λ2→ Col(λ, α), such that:
H1) s ⊆ t⇒ H(s) ⊆ H(t) and s 6= t⇒ H(s) 6= H(t) ;
H2) for every s ∈ 2<λ H(s_〈0〉) 6= H(s_〈1〉) and if dom(s) = δ is limit,
then H(s) =
⋃
γ<δH(s  γ);
H3) denoting for an f ∈ λ2 the function ⋃{H(f  γ) | γ < λ} from λ
into α by fH , if f1, f2 are distinct members of
λ2, then 〈fH1 , fH2 〉 is
Col(λ, α)× Col(λ, α)-generic over M,
H4) the function H∗ : λ2→ λα defined by H∗(f) = fH is continuous.
There is a slight modification of the above construction in [8] which we
are also going to generalize. If δ > λ, δ < λ+
Wλ
, δ is admissible, M = W λδ
and in W λ |M | ≤ λ, then we can construct a function E : <λ2 → Pλ, such
that:
E1) s ⊆ t⇒ E(s) ⊆ E(t) and s 6= t⇒ E(s) 6= E(t) ;
E2) for every s ∈ 2<λ E(s_〈0〉) 6= E(s_〈1〉) and if dom(s) = δ is limit,
then E(s) =
⋃
γ<δ E(s  γ);
E3) if f1, f2 are distinct members of
λ2, then 〈fE1 , fE2 〉 is Pλ × Pλ-generic
over M, where fE is defined as fH in H3) above;
E4) E ∈ W λ
We can get E with these properties as in [8].
From now on we are going to concentrate on the case λ = κ.
We will use the following general lemma about product forcing due to
Solovay.
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Lemma 8.2.7 ([6] pp.13-14) Let P1 and P2 be notions of forcing in M and
let P = P1 × P2. Let G = G1 ×G2 be a generic filter on P. Then M [G1] ∩
M [G2] = M .
Definition 8.2.8 For notational convenience we introduce the following ab-
breviation. For f, g ∈ κ2 call f big for g iff f ∈ W κ[g]−W κ
ωg
κ+
[g].
So f is big for g if f appears in W κ[g] but above the first admissible level.
In the case κ = ω this is equivalent to saying that f ∈ L[g], but f is not
hyperarithmetic in g.
We proceed to the generalization of lemma 1.2 of [8].
Lemma 8.2.9 (AWCκ) For any f, g ∈ κ2 there is an h ≥T g such that
f ∈ W κ[h] and ωhκ+ = ωgκ+, also if f /∈ W κωg
κ+
[g] we have that f is big for h.
Proof. It is easy to see that we can work with g = 0 for simplicity. So
we are looking for an h, such that ωhκ+ = ωκ+ , f ∈ W κ[h] and such that if
f /∈ W κωκ+ then f is big for h.
We construct the function E from above with M = W κωκ+ , λ = κ. We
have E ∈ W κ, so f ∈ W κ[fE] by κ-constructibility. Since fE is Pκ-generic
over W κωκ+ we have W
κ
ωκ+
[fE] is admissible, so ωκ+ = ω
fE
κ+ (since ω
fE
κ+ ≥ ωκ+
always).
To get the second property suppose that f /∈ W κωκ+ . Take
h1 = (〈0〉_f)E,
h2 = (〈1〉_f)E.
Again ωκ+ = ω
h1
κ+ = ω
h2
κ+ and f ∈ W κ[h1] ∩W κ[h2]. By 8.2.7 and condition
(E3) we have that W κωκ+ = W
κ
ωκ+
[h1] ∩W κωκ+ [h2] and since f /∈ W κωκ+ we get
that for some i ∈ {1, 2} f is big for hi.

We adopt the coding of [8].
Definition 8.2.10 Suppose ι : κ×κ→ κ is ”κ-recursive”, i.e. ∆1-definable
in 〈Hκ,∈〉 without parameters. If γ is an ordinal between κ and κ+ and
Θ : κ → γ, the code of Θ is Θˆ : κ → 2 defined by Θˆ(ι(α, β)) = 1 iff
Θ(α) < Θ(β). As in [8] we have that for f ∈ Cκ, W κ[f ⊕ Θˆ] ⊆ W κ[f ][Θ] and
that if Θ is onto, then W κ[f ⊕ Θˆ] = W κ[f ][Θ].
54
Lemma 8.2.11 (TDκ)(AWCκ) If A ⊆ Cκ and |A| > κ then the set
SA = {f ∈ Cκ | ∃g ∈ A(g is big for f)}
contains a cone of Turing degrees.
Proof. This will follow by TDκ once we show that SA contains elements
of arbitrarily big Turing degrees. To this end for h ∈ Cκ we can by |A| > κ
and 8.1.10 find an f ∈ A, such that f /∈ W κ
ωh
κ+
[h]. We apply now 8.2.9 to find
a g ≥T h, with g big for f . Now f is in S and as h was arbitrary the lemma
is established.

Lemma 8.2.12 (TDκ)(AWCκ) If A ⊆ Cκ and |A| > κ, then there is a
bijection FA :
κ2→ A.
Proof. Let f be the vertex for a cone of degrees contained in SA. By
TDκ κ
+ is measurable, and so inaccessible in W κ[f ]. Let ν be the ordinal
from lemma 8.1.11, i.e. ν < κ+ and κ2 ∩W κ[f ] ⊆ W κν [f ]. Notice that for
Θ : κ→ ν we have f ⊕ Θˆ ∈ SA, so we can find g ∈ A which is big for f ⊕ Θˆ.
Denote by gΘ the first such g in the well-ordering of W
κ[f⊕Θˆ]. For surjective
Θ we immediately obtain ν ≤ ωΘˆκ+ ≤ ωf⊕Θˆκ+ and so W κ[f ]∩κ2 ⊆ W κν [f ]∩κ2 ⊆
W κν [f ⊕ Θˆ] ∩ κ2 ⊆ W κ
ωf⊕Θˆ
κ+
[f ⊕ Θˆ] ∩ κ2. As a result gΘ ∈ W κ[f ][Θ]−W κ[f ].
Since κ+ is inaccessible in W κ[f ] and |ν| = κ in V , we can construct a
function H : <κ2→ Col(κ, ν) as above where M = W κ[f ].
Define
FA(h) = ghH for every h ∈ κ2.
For every h we have, since hH is surjective, FA(h) ∈ (W κ[f ][hH ]−W κ[f ])∩A.
From lemma 8.2.7 we get that FA is injective.

Corollary 8.2.13 (TDκ)(AWCκ) If A ⊆ Cκ and |A| > κ, then there is a
partition 〈Bα | α < κ〉 of κ2, such that FA  Bα is continuous for every
α < κ.
Proof. Let f , ν be as in the proof of the lemma. A canonical name for
a subset of κ with respect to Col(κ, ν) is a name of the form {〈αˇ, p〉 | α <
κ ∧ p ∈ Aα}, where Aα is an antichain in Col(κ, ν). Since every antichain of
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Col(κ, ν) which is in W κ[f ] has cardinality κ, we have that there are at most
κ many canonical names for a subset of κ that lie in W κ[f ]. Let 〈τ˙α | α < κ〉
be an enumeration of these names and put
Eα = {Θ : κ→ ν | Θ is Col(κ, ν)-generic over W κ[f ] and gΘ = τ˙αWκ[f ][Θ]},
where gΘ is as in the lemma. Put
Bα = {h ∈ κ2 | H(h) ∈ Eα}.
Now since H is continuous the only thing left to prove is that the function
T : κν → κ2, defined by T (Θ) = gΘ is continuous when restricted to any
Eα. This is however immediate by the Truth lemma for generic extensions
of W κ[f ] by the notion of forcing Col(κ, ν).

The final result follows.
Theorem 8.2.14 (TDκ)(AWCκ)(AWD
∗∗2
κ) For every A ⊆ Cκ the game
G∗κ2(A) is determined.
Proof.
What remains to be shown in addition to the facts in section 7.2 is that
for A ⊆ Cκ with |A| > κ there is a strongly perfect subset of A. By the
Baire cathegory theorem one of the Bα’s, from corollary 8.2.13 say Bα0 is
non-meager, and so it has a strongly perfect subset P . Now since F  Bα0 is
continuous we get F
′′
P is a strongly perfect subset of A.

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